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Abstract 
 
The physical nature of electricity generation and delivery creates special problems for the 
design of efficient markets, notably the need to manage delivery in real time and the 
volatile congestion and associated costs that result. Proposals for the operation of the 
deregulated electricity industry tend towards one of two paradigms: centralized and 
decentralized.  Transmission congestion management can be implemented in the more 
centralized point-to-point approach, as in New York state, where derivative transmission 
congestion contracts (TCCs) are traded, or in the more decentralized flowgate-based 
approach.  While it is widely accepted that theoretically TCCs have attractive properties 
as hedging instruments against congestion cost uncertainty, whether efficient markets for 
them can be established in practice has been questioned.  Based on an empirical analysis 
of publicly available data from years 2000 and 2001, it appears that New York TCCs 
provided market participants with a potentially effective hedge against volatile 
congestion rents. However, the prices paid for TCCs systematically diverged from the 
resulting congestion rents for distant locations and at high prices.  The price paid for the 
hedge not being in line with the congestion rents, i.e. unreasonably high risk premiums 
are being paid, suggests an inefficient market. The low liquidity of TCC markets and the 
deviation of TCC feasibility requirements from actual energy flows are possible 
explanations.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Typically, infrastructure industries, e.g., those involving energy, telecommunications, and 
transportation, have been subject to government regulation due to their natural monopoly 
characteristics.1  Thus, regulation removes the need for multiple firms or duplicate 
transportation networks within a geographic region.  Indeed, it might be economically 
inefficient to build several parallel roads between any two destinations when one road 
conveys traffic just as effectively, despite the potential benefits of competition. 
 
Among infrastructure industries, electricity especially required government regulation 
due to its lack of storability, the complex nature of its transmission (i.e., delivery from 
generator to consumer), and to a lesser extent, economies of scale in its generation.  In 
particular, electricity transmission, unlike other transportation networks, requires 
coördinated behavior to ensure that injections and withdrawals of electricity are 
continuously balanced.2  This coördination is necessitated by physical laws that distribute 
electricity among all possible paths between generator and load in quantities relative to 
path impedances.  Electrical energy cannot be directed from specific generator to specific 
consumer, and events occurring at one network node have implications for the entire 
system.  Therefore, any fully decentralized system would prove impracticably complex 
                                                          
1 These imply that costs decline with output and that a single extensive network is sufficient to deliver the 
final product to consumers. 
2 Since electricity cannot be economically stored on a large scale, smoothing deliveries by inventories is 
impossible. 
 2 
because it would have to be balanced in real-time to prevent its collapse.  As a result, 
electricity supply functions, such as generation and transmission, were historically kept 
vertically integrated under a single regulated entity that exclusively provided all services 
related to electricity supply within a given geographic region.   
 
While vertical integration of generation and transmission internalized many operating and 
investment complementarities, viz., the coördination of efficient electricity dispatch, it, 
nevertheless, turned the potentially competitive generation sector into a de facto 
monopoly.  In order to provide incentives for efficient operation, the electricity industry 
has been restructured in many jurisdictions.  In general, this has meant unbundling of the 
various electricity services so that the layers suitable for competitive supply may be 
provided by specialized firms subject to light regulation.  As identified in Joskow (1997), 
the four main electricity supply functions provided by an investor-owned utility (IOU) 
are: 
• generation:  conversion of primary energy to electricity. 
• transmission:  transportation of electricity along the meshed high-voltage grid to 
substations. 
• distribution:  transportation of electricity along radial low-voltage wires from 
substation to customer meters. 
• retailing:  arrangements for billing, on-site support, and demand management. 
 
In general, the generation and retailing sectors have seen the promotion of competition 
because economies of scale are either exhausted at current levels of production or are not 
applicable at all there (see Wolak (2000)).  These services can, thus, to be provided 
through competitive markets.  For the incumbent utilities, this has generally implied 
either divestiture of their generation assets or their segregation in unregulated parts of the 
company.  The transmission and distribution sectors, however, continue to be regulated 
because of their natural monopoly characteristics.  Outside of these broad guidelines, the 
actual paths taken by electricity industry restructuring movements vary considerably 
across jurisdictions. 
 
The contours of these reforms, as traced out in Wilson (2002), touch upon the two 
extremes in electricity market design.  One approach is highly centralized in that it seeks 
to emulate the tight control of the vertically integrated paradigm by exploiting the 
complementarities between generation and transmission.  In this environment, an 
independent system operator (ISO) not only manages the transmission system, but also 
conducts a de facto market by centralized dispatch.  Such a framework works best when 
ample competition and accurate information is available for the ISO's optimization 
problem.3  At the other extreme is a decentralized approach in which an official market is 
not even required.  Instead of there being a centralized dispatch, market agents can 
transact bilaterally or through markets, such as a day-ahead power exchange (PX), with 
the ISO charged only with protecting system reliability and correcting real-time energy 
                                                          
3 These systems are typically outgrowths of preëxisting centrally coördinated power pools or nationally 
dispatched electricity sectors. 
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imbalances.4  Since there is no explicit coördination of electricity, reserves, or 
transmission markets, such an environment requires a profusion of trading opportunities 
in order to allocate resources efficiently.   
 
In addition to generating electrical energy, an electricity supplier must have the means to 
deliver this energy to the point of enduse at the instant of consumption.  Deliveries cannot 
be levelized by inventories.  Therefore, well-defined transmission rights are crucial to 
efficient electricity production.  Rights can be physical or financial but, at least in the 
U.S., restructuring efforts to date have favored financial.  These rights function not only 
as hedging instruments, but also as mechanisms for prioritizing scheduling, that is, 
ensuring the most profitable electricity trades take place.  Additionally, the congestion 
rents collected from market participants dispatching electricity over congested links 
should provide price signals to guide future investment in the transmission infrastructure, 
although whether these signals can be turned into effective incentives has been hotly 
debated (see Bushnell and Stoft (1997)).  Further, efficient congestion management can 
remove market fragmentation, thereby mitigating the exercise of market power. At the 
same time, however, any set of transmission rights must promote coördinated behavior in 
order to internalize the effects of Kirchhoff's Laws which govern the movement of energy 
on the grid. These Laws result in power flowing not according to the shortest or contract 
path but according to the physical nature of the transmission lines.  Flows along multiple 
paths from the generator to consumer of energy are called loop flows and will affect other 
transactions.  Not only is there not a unique route between generator and load, but also 
more importantly that energy consumed by customers comes from sources quite different 
from the power plant with which the consumer has contracted.  Stoft offers a good 
introduction to the complexities these physical realities imply (see Stoft (2002)).  Similar 
to the general debate over the nature of electricity industry restructuring, the specific 
discussion concerning congestion management within a deregulated framework can also 
be roughly categorized into those advocating centralized and decentralized paradigms 
(see Bushnell (1997)). 
 
Prior to restructuring, a contract path approach to transmission scheduling was common. 
This method calculates the transfer capacity of the links between any two points on the 
network using power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs), based on the myth that energy 
would flow along a known path from generator to consumer.5  The ownership of these 
transmission rights confers a physical right to transmission capability.  In order to keep 
generator dispatch feasible and to account for loop flows caused by Kirchhoff's Laws, in 
principle point-to-point (PTP) rights must be determined for both each pair of points in 
the network and each set of network conditions.  Moreover, because of the number of 
rights issued for a given path depends on those issued for other paths, externalities 
abound; that is, consummated transactions affect other transactions between quite 
different parties.  Advocates of centralized restructured paradigms for the power sector 
                                                          
4 Implicit in this definition is that the ISO ensures the feasibility of executed trades given the grid's transfer 
capabilities. 
5 Each PTDF represents the constant fraction of the capacity of each link along the contract path that is 
required.  As discussed previously, however, there is no unique relationship between the generator and the 
point of consumption.  Due to Kirchhoff's Laws, the energy consumed is very likely being generated at a 
plant that is different from the contracted one. 
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favor locational pricing systems with a PTP approach to congestion management because 
it offers a centralized framework within which to provide adequate congestion cost 
hedging opportunities (see Hogan (1992) and Harvey et al. (1996)).  Typically, in this 
approach, financial, rather than physical, rights to congestion revenues are proposed.  
This approach also serves to guarantee prices to consumers, potentially eliminating the 
considerable variability in congestion costs.  
 
Proponents of a more decentralized paradigm, however, argue that the PTP approach 
obfuscates congestion risk management by market participants, and does not provide 
effective hedging instruments.  Their arguments, while accepting the desirable theoretical 
properties of PTP rights, focus on the low likelihood these markets can operate efficiently 
in practice. This results in price distortions and inefficient dispatch even if generation is 
competitive (see Oren (1997a) and Oren (1997b)).  As an alternative to the PTP 
approach, decentralized congestion management might establish trading of rights only 
along congested transmission bottlenecks (or, flowgates).  In contrast to the PTP 
approach, flowgate-based systems have transmission congestion rights that depend on the 
network topology and are fixed by the physical capabilities of the grid (see Chao and 
Peck (1996), Chao and Peck (1997), and Chao and Peck (1998)).  Because PTDFs remain 
relatively constant over time, the number of flowgate rights is also stable, thereby 
improving market liquidity and enabling more transparent congestion risk management 
(see Chao et al. (2000)).  Congestion along the full length of a contract path can be 
hedged by holding a portfolio of flowgate rights. Also, the responsibility for congestion 
cost risk falls to the parties in an energy sale transaction, i.e., rights trading becomes 
more firmly linked to the energy market.  Advocates of flowgate rights argue more 
efficient congestion markets will in turn enable more efficient energy markets, which is 
the key objective. Consequently, they tend to talk of these rights as active rather than the 
passive financial rights (see Oren (1997b)).  More recently, analysts have also turned 
their attention to possible relationships between the organization of congestion markets 
and market power opportunities (Stoft (1999) and Joskow and Tirole (2000)). 
 
While the literature described provides an ongoing rich debate on the relative theoretical 
properties of congestion rights schemes, to date relatively little empirical work has been 
done on actual functioning congestion rights markets.  In this paper, we analyze the 
effectiveness of transmission congestion risk management in New York, which employs 
a PTP passive financial congestion rights approach, i.e., a system similar to the one 
proposed in Hogan (1992) and Harvey et al. (1996).  We begin in Section 2 by describing 
the deregulated New York framework, its markets for transmission congestion 
management, a theoretical overview of risk hedging using forward contracts, and a 
discussion of the complexity of PTP congestion revenue rights.  Next, in Section 3, we 
discuss the empirical methodology employed.  In Section 4, we present our results and 
interpret them in terms of the debate concerning the design of markets for transmission 
congestion management.  Finally, in Section 5, we offer concluding remarks and 
directions for future research. 
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2. Transmission Management in New York 
 
2.1. NYISO Control Area Structure 
 
The New York Independent Systems Operator (NYISO) is a not-for-profit organization 
charged with reliably operating the electric grid and running fair and open wholesale 
electricity markets in the New York Control Area (NYCA), which consists of the entire 
state of New York.  All electricity that passes through its grid must be scheduled through 
the NYISO.  Approximately half of this electricity is purchased through either the day-
ahead or real-time wholesale electricity markets operated by the NYISO. The other half is 
traded on bilateral contracts.  
 
The state is divided into eleven load zones, shown in Figure 1.  The clearing price of the 
market at any point on the NYCA system, or the Locational Based Marginal Price 
(LBMP), is based on the cost of providing the next MW increment of load to the system.  
The LBMP is calculated by the NYISO for each load zone and at each of over 400 
specific generation buses, or points of injection (POI).  Buyers pay the LBMP calculated 
for the congestion zone in which they take delivery of electricity, or the point of 
withdrawal (POW), and sellers receive the LBMP at the bus to which they supply.  When 
all electricity can be supplied at lowest cost, the price is almost uniform across the state, 
varying only because of losses in the grid.  Even when this ideal outcome is prevented by 
congestion, the price of the minimum cost dispatch, known as the LBMP at the reference 
bus, is the benchmark for all actual prices.  Often, different locations have different 
market-clearing prices because of congestion. Buyers that purchase electricity at a point 
ultimately pay the congestion rent, which is included in the LBMP; however, sellers and 
traders establishing fixed contract prices for delivered electricity are exposed to 
congestion rent uncertainty.  Because congestion rents can be volatile and unpredictable, 
risk-averse market participants want to hedge against this exposure. 
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Figure 1.  NYISO Congestion Zones 
 
2.2. NYISO TCC Markets 
 
The NYISO created the transmission congestion contract (TCC) market as a way for 
market participants to hedge against volatile congestion rents (see p. 36, item 1.44e in 
NYISO (2000)).  TCCs can be defined between the eleven congestion zones, the four 
neighboring control areas (Ontario, PJM, New England, and Québec), and the hundreds 
of buses for which the NYISO calculates LBMP. In all, there are approximately 120,000 
permutations of POIs and POWs.  
 
TCCs entitle the holder to collect the congestion rent between two points (zone, 
substation, or generation bus) on the NYCA system for every hour during a given time 
interval, or effective period. Currently TCCs can be purchased from either of two NYISO 
auctions, initial and reconfiguration. Buyers in either auction are known as primary 
holders. TCCs can also be freely disaggregated and traded in the secondary market. A 
summary of the auctions is included below (see Table 1). Initial auctions, which take 
place twice a year, consist of two stages with a variable number of  rounds in each stage. 
Each set of rounds trades TCCs with only one effective period. For example, a single set 
of rounds exists for two-year TCCs. One-Year TCCs are then sold in subsequent rounds. 
Thus far the TCCs have had effective periods consisting of all hours for six months, one 
year, two years or five years, although this may change in the future. Stage 1 consists of 
at least four rounds, unless otherwise decided by transmission owners. The percentage of 
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available transmission system capability awarded in each round of Stage 1 as TCCs is 
determined by the NYISO. Primary holders of TCCs may offer their TCCs for resale in 
either stage; participants who were awarded TCCs in Stage 1 can offer those TCCs for 
resale in Stage 2. The initial auction is expected to eventually be replaced by an end-state 
auction, in which auction participants will determine the effective period for each TCC 
awarded (see Attachment M, sections 2.0 and 8.4 of NYISO (2000)).  A summary of 
exact auction stages, rounds, and dates appears in Table 18. 
 
Table 1.  NYISO TCC Auction Summary 
  
Initial Auction 
(NYISO organized) 
• Held twice a year 
• ISO determines effective period (six months, one year, two 
years, five years) for TCCs and percentage of transmission 
system capability available for the purchase of TCCs 
auctioned in each round  
• Consists of two multi-round stages 
        -Stage 1: at least four  rounds, unless otherwise decided by   
                       transmission owners 
        -Stage 2: (reconfiguration stage) varying number of rounds 
• Market-clearing price set for each round any POI/POW 
pairs traded 
• TCCs valid for every hour of the effective period 
• Will be replaced by End-State Auction 
Reconfiguration 
Auction 
(NYISO organized) 
• Held monthly 
• Allows holders of TCCs to sell for every hour of the 
following month only 
Secondary Market • Terms determined bilaterally by the trading partners 
• NYISO deals only with primary holder 
End-State Auction 
(NYISO organized) 
• Not active yet 
• Bidders will determine effective period for TCCs 
(otherwise, similar to Initial Auction) 
 
Monthly reconfiguration auctions allow primary holders to sell TCCs for all hours of the 
following month. Primary holders of TCCs may also sell those TCCs in the secondary 
market to secondary holders, i.e., market participants who do not purchase TCCs in an 
auction. Secondary market bilateral trades can be on any terms to which the two parties 
agree. For example, a secondary trade could be for specific days of the month or hours of 
a day. Other than the initial choice of effective periods and the reconfiguration auctions, 
the secondary market is currently the only way for sellers and buyers to tailor the TCCs.  
The secondary market is not regulated by the NYISO, and all settlements are made with 
the primary holder, the party that purchased the TCC in a NYISO auction. If secondary 
holders wish to deal directly with the NYISO, they may apply to become primary holders 
with the NYISO if they meet the relevant financial requirements of the NYISO. 
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A key implementation issue should also be mentioned here.  The introduction of 
competition into electricity markets of course changes the value of historic properties and 
contracts, including transmission rights.  TCCs offer ideal instruments for converting 
historical entitlements to firm transmission capacity into tradable entitlements that keep 
the holders of such entitlements just as well-off economically while enabling them to 
cash out when others can make more efficient use of the transmission capacity covered 
by these entitlements.  In other words, TCCs make it relatively easy to maintain the 
profits of the historical entitlement holders while opening up the transmission system to 
more efficient use, which should satisfy a key constituency in restructuring proceedings. 
 
Before the first NYISO TCC auction, all parties with existing transmission agreements 
were assigned grandfathered rights, which could be converted to TCCs identical to TCCs 
purchased in auctions, except that the effective period is the length of the original right. 
These TCCs can be bought and sold equivalently with new TCCs.  Therefore, the holders 
of historic rights can either continue to perform on their existing agreement and are 
perfectly hedged against any congestion rent at no cost.  Alternatively, if the established 
price of TCCs provides a more attractive option, or the contract ends prematurely, the 
TCC can be sold, and access to the grid passes to higher value transactions.  One of the 
most attractive public policy features of TCCs is that they offer this convenient path to 
competitive open transmission access, which as argued above, is critical to establishing a 
competitive electricity market.  Moreover, as with the other desirable aspects of financial 
transmission rights, capturing these benefits requires that an efficient market be quickly 
established.  If it is not, neither are the holders of grandfathered rights properly 
compensated, nor does access to the grid pass to the highest value users.  However, since 
holders of grandfathered rights are given TCCs tailored to the terms of their transaction, 
they are fully hedged against congestion rents while they hold their TCCs.  In many 
ways, this problem resembles the allocation of historic pollution rights and similar market 
problems could ensue (see, for example, Kolstad (2000)).  Once grandfathered rights and 
TCCs were determined, the remaining transmission capability was allocated to 
transmission owners, who were then obligated to offer this capacity for sale in the 
auction. 
 
In both initial and reconfiguration auctions, each TCC bid consists of a POI, a POW, the 
capacity in MWs, and a price per MW.  There is a single clearing price for each 
permutation of POI and POW in each round. Nodal prices, which allow the clearing price 
for any POI/POW pair to be calculated, are published on the NYISO website 
(http://www.nyiso.com/oasis) between rounds of the auction.  
 
The holder of a TCC is entitled to the LBMP-based congestion rent between the POI I 
and the POW W for all hours in the effective time interval (of length T) of the contract. 
This congestion rent for hour t by market participant j, , is calculated as the 
congestion component of the LBMP at the POW ( ) minus the congestion component 
of the LBMP at the POI ( ) multiplied by the number of MWs owned during the time 
interval of length T by market participant j, : 
jt
WIR
,
,
t
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t
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jT
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,
,
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Equation 1 
Because these contracts are unidirectional, the holder is also responsible for paying 
congestion rent which accrues in the opposite direction (i.e., when is negative).  A 
TCC can exist between any two allowable points in the NYCA system.  
t
WIR ,
 
The clearing price of a TCC determined through a NYISO auction can be negative, which 
means the NYISO will pay the buyer the clearing price for accepting it.  This would 
occur if a buyer predicts congestion in the opposite direction to that for which the TCC is 
defined.  For example, a TCC defined between a POI in New York City and a POW in 
the western part of the state could evoke a negative clearing price if the buyers and sellers 
in the auction quite reasonably predict that congestion will occur into New York City. 
Alternatively, a positive price paid for a TCC suggests that the buyer expects to collect 
positive rent.  The data-reporting convention of the NYISO, takes its own point of view.  
Congestion rents collected by the TCC holder are reported as negative values, i.e. money 
is leaving the ISO, while positive values signify reverse congestion rent the holder is 
responsible for paying, i.e., money is entering the ISO.  Therefore, a stream of negative 
rents reported in NYISO data means the holder of a TCC is collecting rents.  To illustrate, 
a buyer contracting to buy and transmit power into New York City (zone J, N.Y.C. in 
Figure 1), to which access has historically been congested about 50% of the time, will 
typically pay a positive price for a TCC going into the zone J, and receive the positive 
rents paid by users of that transfer capacity, but the later will be reported as negatives by 
the NYISO. 
 
2.3. Theory of Risk Hedging 
 
In order for TCCs to be effective hedges against congestion charges, their procurement 
cost must accurately reflect the cumulative congestion rents to be collected over the 
contracted effective period.  For example, the amount paid to secure a six-month TCC 
from a POI to a POW, should at least be correlated with the cumulative hourly 
congestion rent between these two points during this time interval.  For TCCs to be 
perfect hedges, in the long-run, ignoring interest rates, the TCC procurement cost per 
MW for a time interval of length T between a POI I and a POW W, , should be an 
unbiased estimator of the average congestion rent, 
T
WIc ,
∑
∑∑
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,
1 1
,
,
, , where t is a time 
period index.  In other words, a necessary condition for TCCs to be perfect hedges is ].  For example, this would mean that an electricity seller could exactly hedge 
against the congestion rent between a POI/POW pair.  If actual congestion rents are 
greater (less) than the seller's expectation, then it breaks even by recovering greater 
(lesser) financial congestion rents from its TCC transaction than the purchase implied.  
More generally, TCCs can still be effective hedges by reducing the variance of the cash 
[ TWIT WI REc ,, =
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flow resulting from uncertain transmission congestion as long as their procurement costs 
are correlated with the congestion rents.  A market participant simply has to purchase 
enough of the TCC to hedge its transmission congestion exposure perfectly.  The long-
run consequence of this set of transactions is that the TCC price equilibrates to the 
expected cumulative congestion rent by the principle of arbitrage.6         
 
A complete treatment of hedging would compare the TCC price paid and the actual 
physical congestion rent incurred by the market participant.  Since determining the latter 
quantity is not possible with the publicly available data, we merely describe here the 
approach that could be taken. We assume that for a given POI/POW pair, a market 
participant has to pay an uncertain congestion rent  at time t, where N is the 
number of MWs required,  is the per MW (uncertain) congestion component of the 
spot price at time t, and the random variableω denotes that the price is uncertain at the 
time that the TCC is procured.  Suppose this risky transaction can be hedged by 
purchasing at time 0 a quantity C  of a forward instrument, such as the TCC, at its initial 
per MW price .  At time t, this contract is sold forward at price  per MW, which 
is unknown at time 0.  The resulting cash flow (or, wealth) in period t is, thus, 
. The riskiness of this cash flow is measured by its variance, 
i.e., 
( ) ( )ωω tt NpS =( )ωtp
)
t
0f
f 0
( )ωtf
( ) ( ) ( )( tttt CfSW ωωω −+=
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) tttttttttt CfSCovfVarCSVarCffSVarWVar ωωωωωωω ,220 −+=−+=  
Equation 2 
Minimizing this with respect to yields  tC
NC
t
ttt
f
fpp
t σ
ρσ ,=∗  
Equation 3 
where  and σ  are the standard deviations of the spot and forward prices, 
respectively, and  is the correlation coefficient between them (see Luenberger 
(1997)).  The minimized variance of the cash flow is  
tp
σ
tf
tp
ρ
tf,
( )( ) ( )( ) 22 ,2 NSVarWVar ttttt fpptCCt ρσωω −=∗=  
Equation 4 
 
It is worth noting that the quantity of forwards purchased, , increases with the amount 
of MWs required, the degree of correlation between the forward and spot prices, and the 
volatility of the spot price.  On the other hand, it decreases with the volatility of the 
forward price.  Consequently, it is possible to reduce the variance of the cash flow if there 
is some (positive or negative) correlation between the forward and spot prices.  In the 
extreme case where the forward commodity identically replicates the spot commodity, we 
tC
                                                          
6 Due to the complexities of market structure, arbitrage may not always be possible (see Section 2.4).  Even 
if it were possible, it may not result in perfect equilibration of TCC prices and congestion rents because of 
risk aversion or illiquidity. 
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have , which implies , , and 
.  Therefore, , and C , which implies that 
( ) ( )ωω tt fp =
( )( ) 2,
tpt
f σωω =
( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]ωω ωω tt fEpE =
1= Nt =∗
tt fp
σσ =
( ) 2
tft
pCov σ
( )
= , tt fpρ
0=∗= tt CCtWVar ω .  Hence, a perfect hedge is possible if the forward commodity behaves 
exactly as the spot commodity. TCCs offer the promise of providing an excellent hedge 
because there is a direct relationship between the congestion rent a buyer must pay on an 
electricity purchase and the revenue on a TCC. This benefit can only be captured, 
however, if TCCs are properly priced in efficient markets. 
 
A low level of correlation between the TCC price and the congestion rent (the forward 
and the spot commodities, respectively), however, implies that the level of risk associated 
with hedging increases, thereby making the hedge less effective.  While any level of 
correlation between the spot and forward diminishes cash flow volatility, if either the 
correlation coefficient approaches zero or the variance of the forward price relative to the 
spot price increases without bound, then the market participant is better off using some 
other instrument to hedge its spot market transactions.  Indeed, in such a scenario, the 
existing forward contract, i.e., the TCC, is no longer an effective hedge and is simply a 
lottery.   
 
Since the actual physical congestion rent exposure of each market participant is not 
known, the subsequent analysis focuses instead on the relationship between the price paid 
for TCCs and the resulting congestion rent received, which is an indicator of market 
efficiency. This determines empirically whether the prices paid for TCCs at least 
reflected the returns. Note that we abstract from considering cycles in the underlying 
demand for electricity as done in Audet et al. (2002).  As a result, we implicitly assume 
that the correlation and volatility remain constant over time.  A complete treatment of 
risk hedging would consider this issue in more detail. 
 
2.4. Complexities of PTP Congestion Revenue Rights 
 
In evaluating financial hedging instruments and market performance two questions must 
be addressed:  
1. How good is the hedge, i.e., to what extent does the revenue stream offset the 
fluctuations in the risky cash flow that the instrument is supposed to hedge? 
2. How efficient is the market, i.e., does the market price of the forward instrument 
reflect the expected risky cash flow hedged by the instrument with the proper risk 
premium adjustment? 
 
Much of the discussion surrounding PTP congestion revenue rights, such as NYISO 
TCCs, focuses on the first question, and indeed TCCs potentially provide a perfect hedge 
against real-time congestion charges based on nodal prices.  A 1 MW bilateral transaction 
between two points in a transmission network is charged (or credited) the nodal price 
difference between the POW and the POI. At the same time, assuming that transmission 
rights are fully funded, a 1 MW TCC between two points is an entitlement (or obligation) 
for the difference between the LBMPs at the POI and POW. Thus, regardless of how the 
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system is dispatched, a 1 MW TCC between two nodes is a perfect hedge against the 
uncertain congestion charge between the same two nodes, as explained above.  
 
New transmission users should view the TCC as a mechanism to hedge their exposure to 
congestion risk, while holders of granfathered rights should actively evaluate their 
commercial options with respect to their entitlements.  Both should consider the second 
question above as relevant as the first. That is, a purchaser (or holder) of a TCC must 
assess whether the price of the forward instrument indeed reflects the value it provides in 
making the decision whether to purchase (or hold) the instrument or to face the exposure 
to the real time congestion charges.  
 
In typical financial and commodity markets, competition and liquidity push forward 
prices to the expected spot prices with a proper (market-based) risk premium adjustment. 
Such convergence is achieved through a process of arbitrage. Arbitrage, however, may be 
more difficult when dealing with TCCs for several reasons: 
1. Because of the large number of possible TCCs (about 120,000 are possible in the 
NYISO), liquidity of these instruments is relatively low, implying that there are few 
secondary markets that enable reconfiguration and reselling.  
2. In order to maintain financial solvency of the system operator, who is the counter 
party to TCCs, the configuration of TCC types must satisfy the simultaneous 
feasibility conditions that are dictated by the physical system constraints. That is, the 
NYISO can only pay out congestion rents to TCC holds at approximately the same 
level it collects them. Consequently, pricing and trading of TCCs is done through a 
central periodic auction. 
3. Because of the interaction among the different TCCs, through the simultaneous 
feasibility security-constrained power flow, prices of the TCC resulting from the 
auction, as well as the congestion charges hedged by these TCCs, are highly 
interrelated. An efficient market (i.e., one that correctly prices TCCs) must anticipate 
not only the uncertainty in congestion prices due to technical contingencies and load 
fluctuation, but also the shift in the operating point within the feasible region which is 
determined by the economic dispatch procedure. 
 
To illustrate the potential obstacles to market efficiency we will consider an illustrative 
three-node example (see Figure 2). For simplicity we assume a direct-current (DC) model 
with no transmission losses and further assume that the transmission capacity on each 
line is fixed. Realistic considerations such as alternating-current (AC) networks, line 
losses, and n-1 contingency planning further impede the achievement of efficient TCC 
pricing. 
 
In the following three-node network, all lines have equal reactance whereas their thermal 
limits (or flowgate constraints) are as shown. All the generators serve the load at node 3, 
and the two hedging instruments available are TCC 1-3 and TCC 2-3. The nomogram in 
Figure 3 illustrates the feasible region for all possible combinations of TCCs that will not 
violate any of the flowgate constraints. The facets of the nomogram represent these 
flowgate constraints. In the TCC auction, bids are submitted for the two TCC types, and 
the market is cleared in order to maximize total auction revenue. The market-clearing 
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price for each of the TCCs is based on the respective marginal bids accepted. For 
instance, if bid prices for the two TCCs are about the same, then the TCC awards will be 
based on point C on the nomogram, and the TCC prices will equal the marginal bids 
corresponding to the awarded TCC quantities.  
 
In real time, the optimal dispatch is determined so as to minimize total dispatch cost 
subject to thermal flow constraints and Kirchhoff’s Laws. Depending on the energy offer 
prices of generators G1, G2, and G3 and the demand function of L3, the least-cost day-
ahead optimal dispatch ends up at point B on the nomogram. Both the day-ahead 
congestion prices and the TCC payouts are equal to the corresponding nodal price 
differences between nodes 2 and 3 and 1 and 3, respectively. These nodal prices are 
based on the day-ahead operating point B. Moreover, while the congestion charges are 
collected on the transactions reflected by point B, the TCC quantities are based on the 
TCC award mix represented by point C.  Since point C is a suboptimal day-ahead 
dispatch solution, it follows that the congestion charges will always suffice to cover the 
TCC settlement. However, the ratio of settlement prices (represented by the slope of the 
supporting line at point B) is different from the ratio of TCC prices represented by the 
slope of the supporting line at point C.  Therefore, in order for the market to price the 
TCCs correctly, it must account for uncertainty in load and generation prices as well as 
for the movements of the real-time operating point resulting from the dispatch 
optimization.  
 
The empirical question addressed in this paper is whether, in spite of the perceived 
complexity, the market for TCC hedges is efficient in the sense that it can produce the 
correct TCC prices that are consistent with the risk they hedge against.    
 
 
Figure 2.  Three-Node DC Example 
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Figure 3.  Feasibility Region 
 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
 
This initial analysis covers only six-month TCCs that were purchased in the four initial 
auctions in 2000 and 2001.  Approximately 70% of all TCC capacity is initially 
purchased in the six-month auctions.  The price of each contract was compared to the 
resulting congestion rent that accrued between its POI and POW during its effective 
period.  This analysis does not take into account Stage 2 of the initial auctions or the 
monthly reconfiguration auctions, in which these six-month TCCs could have been re-
sold or disaggregated.  Moreover, the analysis does not consider trading in the secondary 
market, where the holder of a TCC could sell part or all of a TCC without notifying the 
NYISO.  Data on Stage 2 and the monthly reconfiguration auction are released by the 
NYISO, but the fear of double counting deterred their consideration here.  No 
information is readily available on the unofficial secondary market.  In reality, any gains 
or losses on the TCC may have been split among various holders during its lifetime. 
Effectively, the assumption is that the original purchaser of the TCC desired it purely as a 
hedge against the uncertain congestion costs on a contract to deliver electricity 
physically.  Further, this original purchaser held the TCC for its effective period and 
collected (or paid) all of the rent associated with it. In other words, the rent collected by 
TCC owners is compared to the initial purchase price, as if the original purchaser held the 
TCC exclusively to hedge energy trades for its entire effective period. 
 
The NYISO publishes the results of each auction on its website, including the POI, the 
POW, the number of MWs in the contract, and the clearing price, in terms of $/MW-
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effective period.7 For each TCC awarded, the new owner must pay that clearing price for 
each MW in the award. Given the POI and POW of each contract, the hourly congestion 
rent is calculated by subtracting the day-ahead congestion component of the LBMP at the 
POI from the same at the POW.  Hourly LBMP data from the day-ahead market are 
published on the NYISO website for each zone and bus.  These hourly rents are summed 
at the POI and the POW over the entire effective period to determine the quantity-
weighted average net congestion rent collected by each TCC:  
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Equation 5 
This net congestion rent is then compared with the price originally paid for the TCC, .  
In particular, we test the hypothesis that the price paid for the TCC effective during time 
interval T using the information available before this interval starts is an efficient 
estimator for the congestion rent: 
T
WIc ,
 [ ]1,,1 −− Ω= TTWIT WIT REc  
Equation 6 
We test this hypothesis via the following regression specification: 
TT
WI
TT
WI cR εββ +⋅+= − ,110,  
Equation 7 
In an efficient market,  and  would not be statistically significantly different from 0 
and 1, respectively.   
0β 1β
 
Each of the four auctions analyzed had four rounds, except for the autumn 2000 auction 
which consisted of two rounds. The number of distinct permutations of POIs and POWs 
for each of these rounds is displayed below in Table 2.  Thus, of all the thousands of  
possible POI/POW pairs, the most traded in any auction is only 262 (in spring 2001).  
 
Table 2.  Number of TCCs Traded in Initial Auctions Between Distinct POI and POW Pairs 
(Spring 2000 to Autumn 2001) 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Total 
Spring 2000 35 45 43 41 75 
Autumn 2000 111 63 - - 141 
Spring 2001 123 122 98 110 262 
Autumn 2001 89 108 106 93 224 
 
 
                                                          
7 Virtually all NYISO data used in this paper are available at electricitymarketdata.lbl.gov. 
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4. Results and Analysis 
 
Here, we discuss the results of the NYISO initial TCC auction using the available data 
between spring 2000 and autumn 2001.  For each round in each initial auction, we 
present summary statistics, calculate the effectiveness of TCCs as hedges for 
transmission congestion, and estimate the degree to which market participants predicted 
congestion patterns correctly using TCCs.  In order to remove the effect of outlying 
points, in each case, we perform the analysis by first including and then excluding the 
furthest 10% of the points from the locus of zero-profit points.  Moreover, in order to 
avoid weighting TCCs by the number of awards, in Section 4.2, we treat multiple TCCs 
awarded between any POI/POW pair as a single award.  This enables us to weight the 
various TCC prices and congestion rents equally. 
 
4.1. Total Awards Analysis 
 
For each six-month NYISO TCC awarded in an initial auction between spring 2000 and 
autumn 2001, we determine the price paid (in $/MW) along with the resulting hourly 
congestion rent (also in $/MW) as expressed by Equation 5.  Based on these data, we 
calculate the average price (or equivalently, purchasing cost) and congestion rent during 
the six-month interval, along with their standard deviations and correlation coefficients 
(see Table 3 through Table 6). 8 
 
For a new market such as the NYISO TCC, there are no historical data upon which to 
base one's perceptions about the relationship between forward and spot prices.  A rational 
prior expectation, however, is that TCC prices will be unbiased estimators of the resulting 
congestion rents, as explained before.  Therefore, the market participants who anticipate 
congestion to occur in the direction of POI to POW over a given transmission path 
purchase TCCs, i.e., offer positive prices, while those who expect POW to POI 
congestion take the opposite position.  
 
Figure 5 through Figure 32 show scatter plots of TCC prices and revenues for all rounds 
of all four auctions studied here, which total 14 auctions. Examination of the data 
illustrates that most market participants expected POI to POW congestion, and thus, 
offered positive prices for TCCs.  In line with their expectations, congestion frequently 
occurred in the direction of POI to POW.  Indeed, there was a high correlation between 
the price paid and rent received. However, the average participant not only predicted the 
direction of congestion correctly, but also profited from the transaction.9  These plots of 
                                                          
8 The average cost and rent reported in these tables have the units $/MW for the six month period. This 
translates into values ranging from $0.70/MWh to $2.20/MWh, which are consistent with values for 
congestion. 
9 Market participants "correctly predict congestion" if the sign of the price paid is the same as the sign of 
the congestion rent received.  By contrast, they "profit" if the congestion rent received is greater than the 
price paid. 
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the TCC price and the congestion rent together with the 45° line10 illustrates how 
accurately market participants predicted congestion.  For example, in Figure 5, almost 
90% of the data points are in the two quadrants through which the 45° line passes.  This 
indicates that market participants usually correctly predicted the direction of congestion. 
Furthermore, except for the Spring 2000 semester, market participants profited in over 
50% of the TCC transactions.  This outcome is true even if the 10% of the points that are 
furthest away from the 45° line are eliminated. 
 
Following from Equation 5, the scatter plot of TCC prices and resulting congestion rents 
should be distributed around the 45° line.  A cursory examination of the scatter plots 
indicates that most data points appear to lie in the top right quadrant, but below the 45° 
line.  In order to determine the nature of this relationship, we fit an ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) regression line to the data.  The fitted lines corroborate the bias by typically being 
above the 45° line for negative TCC prices and below it for positive TCC prices.  
Moreover, the hypothesis that the regression slope coefficient is different from 1 (the 
slope of the 45° line) is statistically significant at the 99% level (except in Round 3 of 
Autumn 2001 when there is no clear relationship).  This implies that while the market for 
TCCs functions well for small hedges, it is less efficient for larger values.  In terms of 
Equation 8, these results imply that  and .  Consequently, market participants 
systematically lose money when they try to hedge large congestion risk exposures.
00 >β 11 <β
11  
 
Table 3.  NYISO TCC Total Award Auction (Spring 2000) 
100% Data Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
Average Cost 1311.75 9910.40 5975.57 10822.09 7182.54
Average Rent 1810.90 1515.37 2958.26 6883.61 3282.71
Correlation 0.58 0.68 0.75 0.39 0.61
STDEV of cost 17739.24 13771.58 14814.78 9351.14 14533.90
STDEV of rent 16080.69 18847.05 17255.61 14945.02 16962.44
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.91 1.37 1.16 1.60 1.17
Total number of awards 62 75 76 69 282
Correct predictions 55 61 56 50 222
% Correct predictions 88.71% 81.33% 73.68% 72.46% 78.72%
Winners 31 19 35 27 112
% Winners 50.00% 25.33% 46.05% 39.13% 39.72%
90% Data
Average Cost -420.40 9562.79 5192.44 11079.09 6561.88
Average Rent 748.33 463.30 1309.00 5518.11 1986.40
Correlation 0.48 0.67 0.82 0.47 0.62
STDEV of cost 16081.55 13157.90 14819.19 9229.91 14123.85
STDEV of rent 11284.03 15678.54 16097.56 13462.56 14465.23
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.70 1.19 1.09 1.46 1.02
Total number of awards 56 68 68 62 254
Correct predictions 49 55 52 47 203
% Correct predictions 87.50% 80.88% 76.47% 75.81% 79.92%
Winners 29 16 30 22 97
% Winners 51.79% 23.53% 44.12% 35.48% 38.19%  
 
                                                          
10 This is the locus of all zero-profit points, i.e., those for which the TCC price paid is equal to the 
congestion rent collected. 
11 If indeed the market participants are over-paying for larger exposures, then it would seem to imply that 
they could be risk averse.  In that case, the efficient relationship between TCC prices and the congestion 
rents would not be a 45° line but a concave, non-linear function. 
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Table 4.  NYISO TCC Total Award Auction (Autumn 2000) 
100% Data Round 1 Round 2 All Rounds
Average Cost 23900.89 6254.97 20552.89
Average Rent 14016.08 5283.25 12359.18
Correlation 0.90 0.87 0.91
STDEV of cost 16985.67 11334.82 17486.29
STDEV of rent 9287.81 7360.45 9580.76
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.55 0.65 0.55
Total number of awards 363 85 448
Correct predictions 313 52 365
% Correct predictions 86.23% 61.18% 81.47%
Winners 112 61 173
% Winners 30.85% 71.76% 38.62%
90% Data
Average Cost 25846.73 5543.46 21977.05
Average Rent 14720.35 4748.69 12819.81
Correlation 0.92 0.88 0.93
STDEV of cost 16220.33 11236.56 17331.79
STDEV of rent 9106.53 7484.10 9644.92
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.56 0.67 0.56
Total number of awards 327 77 404
Correct predictions 284 44 328
% Correct predictions 86.85% 57.14% 81.19%
Winners 85 57 142
% Winners 25.99% 74.03% 35.15%  
 
Table 5.  NYISO TCC Total Award Auction (Spring 2001) 
100% Data Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
Average Cost 3163.58 2508.23 3246.25 3179.82 2997.96
Average Rent 1544.85 1394.73 1664.20 1867.28 1601.77
Correlation 0.82 0.71 0.87 0.81 0.81
STDEV of cost 11840.91 8102.64 14145.08 11656.08 11418.09
STDEV of rent 4900.30 4271.15 6024.32 4276.94 4861.50
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.41 0.53 0.43 0.37 0.43
Total number of awards 186 198 150 159 693
Correct predictions 129 133 117 122 501
% Correct predictions 69.35% 67.17% 78.00% 76.73% 72.29%
Winners 104 101 73 81 359
% Winners 55.91% 51.01% 48.67% 50.94% 51.80%
90% Data
Average Cost 1272.65 1209.12 211.26 1528.93 1085.94
Average Rent 959.49 993.06 528.69 1414.03 981.47
Correlation 0.67 0.74 0.75 0.80 0.73
STDEV of cost 5491.41 5067.81 3956.89 6303.44 5297.42
STDEV of rent 3525.43 3899.89 3697.71 3467.13 3663.50
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.64 0.77 0.93 0.55 0.69
Total number of awards 168 179 134 144 625
Correct predictions 118 117 103 108 446
% Correct predictions 70.24% 65.36% 76.87% 75.00% 71.36%
Winners 97 97 70 76 340
% Winners 57.74% 54.19% 52.24% 52.78% 54.40%  
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Table 6.  NYISO TCC Total Award Auction (Autumn 2001) 
100% Data Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 All Rounds
Average Cost -226.81 -4491.38 426.39 -175.46 -1401.39
Average Rent 789.00 -2806.34 742.35 376.60 -462.13
Correlation 0.24 0.98 0.89 0.91 0.77
STDEV of cost 9132.35 6943.24 2427.00 1917.55 6345.15
STDEV of rent 2613.84 4911.50 1772.49 1580.04 3780.56
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.29 0.71 0.73 0.82 0.60
Total number of awards 125 229 163 146 663
Correct predictions 75 155 107 91 428
% Correct predictions 60.00% 67.69% 65.64% 62.33% 64.56%
Winners 74 191 121 110 496
% Winners 59.20% 83.41% 74.23% 75.34% 74.81%
90% Data
Average Cost 412.42 -5141.78 74.53 -117.23 -1666.00
Average Rent 521.83 -3354.49 478.00 406.39 -824.36
Correlation 0.88 0.99 0.82 0.80 0.98
STDEV of cost 1829.60 6681.31 1508.46 1005.77 4759.76
STDEV of rent 1417.73 4693.11 1290.70 991.70 3420.50
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.77 0.70 0.86 0.99 0.72
Total number of awards 113 200 147 132 592
Correct predictions 65 139 95 79 378
% Correct predictions 57.52% 69.50% 64.63% 59.85% 63.85%
Winners 67 171 112 103 453
% Winners 59.29% 85.50% 76.19% 78.03% 76.52%  
 
4.2. Unique Award Analysis 
 
In order to weight each distinct TCC equally rather than by the number of awards, here 
we repeat the analysis of Section 4.1 after discarding multiple instances of each 
TCC/congestion rent pair.  Our concern is that by counting n instances of a given TCC 
award as n separate data points, we weight the summary statistics by the more heavily 
traded transmission paths.  This not only skews the mean and standard deviation towards 
those of the high-volume paths, but also might increase (the absolute value of) the 
correlation between TCC prices and congestion rents.  For example, if multiple TCCs are 
awarded for only a few transmission paths, then their price paid and congestion rents 
collected artificially increase the correlation coefficient overall.     
 
Overall, the removal of multiple TCC awards does not significantly alter the analysis of 
Section 4.1 (see Table 7 through Table 10).  Indeed, market participants still profit and 
predict most of the transmission congestion correctly via TCCs (see Figure 33 through 
Figure 60).  At the same time, the fitted OLS regression lines are below the 45° line for 
most positive TCC prices paid.12  This affirms the finding of Section 4.1 that TCC market 
participants were systematically unsuccessful at hedging larger risk exposures.13   
 
Although we demonstrate that the NYISO TCC market is inefficient in each auction, it 
could still functioning well over all.  Indeed, during any given effective period, there is 
likely to be a deviation between the price paid and the rent received.  However, for the 
entire data set, the two quantities could still be equal in expectation as market participants 
learn how to use the instrument more efficiently over time.  Cumulative analysis of all the 
data available reveals that the periodic results obtained earlier are robust over time (see 
Table 11 and Figure 4).  In particular, the fitted OLS regression line is below the 45° 
                                                          
12 This is not true in a few cases where 10% of the most outlying data are removed. 
13 We also considered unweighting the TCCs by comparing the total price paid and the total congestion rent 
collected.  However, it made little difference in the results from Section 4.1. 
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line14 for most positive TCC prices indicating that market participants systematically 
over-pay for large risk exposures.  This can also be gauged intuitively from the summary 
statistics:  even though almost two-thirds of the transactions are "winners," the average 
transaction is a "loser," i.e., results in a TCC price paid that is greater than the congestion 
rent received.           
 
Since the scatter plot and OLS regression indicate the inefficiency of the TCC market for 
large congestion risk exposures, we posit that TCCs would also be unsuccessful hedges 
for geographically distant locations.  Using the map of NYISO congestion zones (see 
Figure 1), we construct a measure of distance between any two POI/POW locations in the 
control area.  We obtain this geographical indicator (GI) by first determining the zones 
in which the POI and POW are situated and then calculating the number of zonal 
interfaces between the pair.  For example, the GI for the pair of zones "West" and 
"N.Y.C." is 7.  After determining GIs for all pairs of zones (see Table 12), we plot them 
with the predictive power index (PPI), where  
T
WI
T
WI
T
WI cRPPI ,,, −=  
Equation 8 
Here, is the PPI for a duration of length T between POI I and POW W.  The larger 
value of , the less accurate the ability of the buyer of a TCC between POI I and 
POW W to predict congestion.
T
WIPPI ,
PPI TWI ,
15  
 
With the exception of some rounds in the first and last semesters, the results of the 
geographical analysis indicate a high degree of correlation between the GI and PPI (see 
Table 14 through Table 17).  By plotting the two indices, we determine that the PPI 
increases, often superlinearly, with the GI (see Figure 61 through Figure 74).  TCC 
markets seem to function relatively well for hedges of intrazonal or adjacent-zone 
congestion, providing TCC holders with a revenue accurate to within a few thousand 
dollars per MW (or, less than a dollar per MWh) of the purchase price.  As the POI and 
POW get further apart, however, the discrepancy between the price paid and rent 
received increases to over a few dollars per MWh.16  This relationship indicates that the 
market for TCCs is not efficient across multiple congestion interfaces. 
 
                                                          
14 The t-statistics for and  are 3.47 and 25.86, respectively. 
^
0β
^
1β
15 Since we use an absolute measure, it may be that it picks up on the correlation between the quantity of 
transmission capability and the POI/POW distance.  The use of a relative measure, e.g., employing a 
percentage difference, is precluded, however, because it understates (overstates) the severity of large 
(small) deviations.  It is, therefore, not effective at measuring differences between the two quantities.  
16 This relationship is not as convincing for the first and last semesters of trading.  We conjecture that 
trading in the first semester (Spring 2000) was subject to the usual warm-up period in which market 
participants learned market rules and procedures.  Therefore, the prices offered were not indicative of the 
market participants' true valuations of congestion rents.  In Autumn 2001, on the other hand, the NYISO 
region experienced a drop in electricity consumption as a result of the 11 September attacks, thereby 
disrupting the relationship between prices paid and rents received. The Autumn 2001 auctions were 
actually under way on 11 September. 
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Table 7.  NYISO TCC Unique Award Auction (Spring 2000) 
100% Data Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
Average Cost 5778.92 7370.75 3212.19 9798.14 6586.69
Average Rent 3677.52 3232.28 2953.23 8273.36 4559.69
Correlation 0.61 0.67 0.75 0.48 0.63
STDEV of cost 15422.06 14160.65 13188.83 10643.84 13474.37
STDEV of rent 17659.46 20445.05 17311.70 18529.78 18556.00
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 1.15 1.44 1.31 1.74 1.38
Total number of awards 35 45 44 43 167
Correct predictions 28 31 29 26 114
% Correct predictions 80.00% 68.89% 65.91% 60.47% 68.26%
Winners 15 16 23 20 74
% Winners 42.86% 35.56% 52.27% 46.51% 44.31%
90% Data
Average Cost 5895.63 8504.60 2467.01 8865.76 6403.51
Average Rent 3593.87 5024.70 2729.53 4804.01 4038.08
Correlation 0.59 0.50 0.71 0.49 0.57
STDEV of cost 14619.70 12299.56 11075.77 10719.30 12276.57
STDEV of rent 12398.58 13267.84 11605.84 12071.85 12224.73
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.85 1.08 1.05 1.13 1.00
Total number of awards 32 41 40 39 152
Correct predictions 25 28 25 23 101
% Correct predictions 78.13% 68.29% 62.50% 58.97% 66.45%
Winners 14 15 22 17 68
% Winners 43.75% 36.59% 55.00% 43.59% 44.74%  
 
Table 8.  NYISO TCC Unique Award Auction (Autumn 2000) 
100% Data Round 1 Round 2 All Rounds
Average Cost 2776.78 3349.46 2980.84
Average Rent 3300.52 3319.79 3307.38
Correlation 0.80 0.85 0.82
STDEV of cost 9659.96 9076.94 9433.94
STDEV of rent 6461.88 6599.08 6492.03
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.67 0.73 0.69
Total number of awards 112 62 174
Correct predictions 63 31 94
% Correct predictions 56.25% 50.00% 54.02%
Winners 92 49 141
% Winners 82.14% 79.03% 81.03%
90% Data
Average Cost 87.82 1720.70 680.65
Average Rent 1663.44 2465.63 1954.68
Correlation 0.77 0.89 0.80
STDEV of cost 2258.68 6779.88 4512.09
STDEV of rent 4267.56 6032.49 4977.03
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 1.89 0.89 1.10
Total number of awards 100 57 157
Correct predictions 51 26 77
% Correct predictions 51.00% 45.61% 49.04%
Winners 88 48 136
% Winners 88.00% 84.21% 86.62%  
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Table 9.  NYISO TCC Unique Award Auction (Spring 2001) 
100% Data Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
Average Cost 646.30 787.87 685.84 2237.10 1077.35
Average Rent 686.43 563.45 279.49 938.23 625.86
Correlation 0.66 0.62 0.80 0.79 0.71
STDEV of cost 8373.52 7448.32 10358.42 10946.63 9280.25
STDEV of rent 3944.27 4110.36 4742.90 3563.27 4083.03
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.47 0.55 0.46 0.33 0.44
Total number of awards 124 121 98 110 453
Correct predictions 84 79 73 79 315
% Correct predictions 67.74% 65.29% 74.49% 71.82% 69.54%
Winners 82 68 45 50 245
% Winners 66.13% 56.20% 45.92% 45.45% 54.08%
90% Data
Average Cost -684.83 -160.46 -167.91 256.90 -204.61
Average Rent 250.76 469.77 14.61 361.05 284.33
Correlation 0.80 0.77 0.90 0.72 0.80
STDEV of cost 2599.74 2609.14 3558.16 2761.19 2884.96
STDEV of rent 3190.61 3279.54 3599.19 2256.32 3109.69
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 1.23 1.26 1.01 0.82 1.08
Total number of awards 112 109 89 99 409
Correct predictions 76 67 67 69 279
% Correct predictions 67.86% 61.47% 75.28% 69.70% 68.22%
Winners 77 64 42 48 231
% Winners 68.75% 58.72% 47.19% 48.48% 56.48%  
 
Table 10.  NYISO TCC Unique Award Auction (Autumn 2001) 
100% Data Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 All Rounds
Average Cost -905.24 -638.18 369.34 388.68 -190.18
Average Rent 812.17 18.01 737.67 730.12 555.45
Correlation 0.11 0.96 0.91 0.95 0.48
STDEV of cost 10306.66 4397.91 2234.91 3201.55 5752.73
STDEV of rent 2604.89 3145.90 1842.65 2331.97 2546.99
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.25 0.72 0.82 0.73 0.44
Total number of awards 89 108 104 95 396
Correct predictions 58 60 73 63 254
% Correct predictions 65.17% 55.56% 70.19% 66.32% 64.14%
Winners 62 85 82 73 302
% Winners 69.66% 78.70% 78.85% 76.84% 76.26%
90% Data
Average Cost 583.61 -293.06 -25.11 142.37 77.44
Average Rent 749.55 250.98 386.44 583.96 477.35
Correlation 0.97 0.96 0.90 0.88 0.95
STDEV of cost 2391.20 2377.29 1069.99 928.02 1848.60
STDEV of rent 2158.94 2109.64 1202.39 1011.88 1705.04
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.90 0.89 1.12 1.09 0.92
Total number of awards 80 98 94 86 358
Correct predictions 52 51 65 55 223
% Correct predictions 65.00% 52.04% 69.15% 63.95% 62.29%
Winners 56 78 76 68 278
% Winners 70.00% 79.59% 80.85% 79.07% 77.65%  
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Table 11. NYISO TCC Unique Award Auction (All Auctions) 
Average Cost 1707.18
Average Rent 1547.26
Correlation 0.60
STDEV of cost 9324.63
STDEV of rent 8062.91
Ratio of stdev (rent/cost) 0.86
Total number of awards 1185
Number of correct predictions 895
% Correct predictions 75.53%
Winners 762
% Winners 64.30%  
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Figure 4. TCC Price Paid and Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data for All Rounds and 
Auctions, Unique Awards) 
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Table 12.  NYISO Geographical Indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 0 1 2 4 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 4 5 1 1
2 1 0 1 3 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 9 3 4 2 1
3 2 1 0 2 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 9 2 3 1 1
4 4 3 2 0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 2 2 2 3
5 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 1 1
6 4 3 2 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 9 2 1 2 2
7 4 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 9 2 1 2 1
8 5 4 3 3 2 2 1 0 1 2 3 9 3 2 3 2
9 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 1 0 1 2 9 4 3 4 2
10 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 2 1 0 1 9 5 4 5 1
11 8 7 6 6 5 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 6 5 6 2
12 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9
13 4 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 9 0 3 2 2
14 5 4 3 2 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 9 3 0 3 3
15 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 9 2 3 0 2
16 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 9 2 3 2 0
POW Zone
PO
I Z
on
e
 
 
 
Table 13.  NYISO Zonal Key 
Zone Number Zone Name
1 Wes
2 Geneseo
3 Central
4 Nort
5 Mohawk Valley
6 Capital
7 Hudson Valley
8 Millwood
9 Dunwoodie
10 New York City
11 Long Island
12 No such zone
13 Hydro-Québec
14 New England
15 Ontario
16 PJM
t
h
 
 
Table 14. NYISO TCC Geographical Analysis (100% Data for Spring 2000) 
100% Data Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
GI-PPI Correlation 0.01 0.39 0.26 0.46 0.29
Avg PPI for GI of 0 7808.49 7903.84 6468.21 5225.97 6721.36
Avg PPI for GI of 1 16856.29 16195.20 6265.14 16145.58 14798.33
Avg PPI for GI of 2 13043.03 15597.16 12324.51 21752.76 16211.82
Avg PPI for GI of 3 10187.15 12958.78 12833.76 15300.51 13121.64
Avg PPI for GI of 4+ 10873.33 20335.84 12157.66 18428.32 15607.75
Avg PPI 12084.36 13050.25 8253.24 12110.95 11360.69  
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Table 15.  NYISO TCC Geographical Analysis (100% Data for Autumn 2000) 
Round 1 Round 2 All Rounds
GI-PPI Correlation 0.42 0.45 0.42
Avg PPI for GI of 0 1953.12 1436.48 1753.93
Avg PPI for GI of 1 3444.58 3164.47 3351.21
Avg PPI for GI of 2 4890.16 4773.73 4862.58
Avg PPI for GI of 3 8022.56 2386.91 7083.29
Avg PPI for GI of 4+ 8712.89 5963.49 6945.42
Avg PPI 3579.30 2899.98 3337.24  
 
Table 16. NYISO TCC Geographical Analysis (100% Data for Spring 2001) 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
GI-PPI Correlation 0.51 0.26 0.68 0.56 0.52
Avg PPI for GI of 0 1923.55 2248.81 1367.53 1343.85 1765.27
Avg PPI for GI of 1 1431.81 2054.89 1380.97 2885.19 1970.84
Avg PPI for GI of 2 4099.12 4659.81 7728.00 8359.57 5723.79
Avg PPI for GI of 3 5049.84 4547.16 3824.80 12459.07 6710.71
Avg PPI for GI of 4+ 24748.11 15439.93 35883.51 24411.42 25012.55
Avg PPI 2729.26 2718.06 2580.38 3423.23 2861.63  
 
 
Table 17. NYISO TCC Geographical Analysis (100% Data for Autumn 2001) 
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 All Rounds
GI-PPI Correlation -0.07 0.39 0.19 0.18 0.01
Avg PPI for GI of 0 3477.65 731.04 608.91 676.45 1410.16
Avg PPI for GI of 1 523.05 1202.39 650.86 618.68 800.74
Avg PPI for GI of 2 292.89 646.34 837.27 1058.57 780.72
Avg PPI for GI of 3 1943.52 1361.23 1030.56 735.49 1201.17
Avg PPI for GI of 4+ 1981.93 3386.67 1134.80 1337.14 2043.57
Avg PPI 2223.56 1075.85 699.15 780.38 1165.93  
 
4.3. Comparison With Established Forwards Trading 
 
Overall, market participants in NYISO TCC auctions seem to predict the direction and 
severity of congestion with reasonable success. However, data analysis from the first two 
years of trading indicates that the NYISO TCC market is less helpful to TCC buyers in 
hedging congestion risk that is either large (worth more than $1/MWh, or $4380/MW) or 
spread across multiple transmission congestion interfaces. Perhaps due to the way in 
which TCCs are defined, their prices do not reflect the congestion rents received for 
larger exposures. As a result, market participants consistently predict transmission 
congestion incorrectly while using TCCs for hedging all but the most straightforward 
exposures.  
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The NYISO TCC market's PTP system is based on forward trading of thousands of 
different POI/POW permutations.  Therefore, trading is thinner and opportunities for 
efficient price discovery weak.  Further, TCCs are defined in a rigid way, i.e., a fixed 
capacity over a fixed period, with high transactions costs involved in disaggregating them 
in the secondary market. This makes TCC trading more difficult for market participants.  
Alternatively, in more compact markets, risk management is more straightforward 
because the forward positions required to hedge against a given spot market exposure are 
immediate.  Moreover, because TCC prices are based on an artificial congestion pattern 
verified as feasible but not necessarily likely at the time of the auction, actual congestion 
patterns will differ leaving TCCs mispriced.  Since actual PTP transfer capability 
depends on the actual power flows, or at least those seen in day-ahead trading, secondary 
trading of TCCs is limited, resulting in illiquidity. This attribute makes it difficult to 
hedge using PTP instruments such as NYISO TCCs without ex ante knowledge of 
transmission congestion. Such obfuscation is the likely cause of the poor performance of 
NYISO TCC markets, as indicated by the data in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
5. Conclusions 
 
The debate over the nature of electricity industry restructuring has loosely divided 
analysts into two camps supporting centralized versus decentralized paradigms. While the 
former relies on a central authority to be responsible for operations and organized 
markets, the latter leaves most decisions to be resolved in autonomous markets. Within 
the context of transmission congestion management, the more centralized paradigm tends 
to use a PTP approach by defining rights to the congestion rent collected between POI-
POW pairs, and allocating such financial rights to holders of historic transmission rights. 
While such PTP rights potentially provide a perfect hedge for a transaction between the 
corresponding nodes, the pricing of such rights in poorly functioning markets may have 
little to do with their realized value.  Thus, market participants will have difficulty 
hedging congestion risk of a transaction at the right price; that is, while a perfect hedge 
may be possible, the price paid for it could be exorbitant.  By contrast, the flowgate-based 
trading offers a more decentralized approach by defining a small number of highly liquid 
rights. Market participants then select the desired flowgates on which to hedge and adjust 
their portfolio of rights to track congestion patterns. 
 
In order to examine the performance of a system employing the PTP approach, we 
empirically analyze the NYISO TCC market, using publicly available data from 2000 and 
2001 on TCC prices paid and congestion rents collected by market participants.  We find 
that by some simple measures the market performs well. For example, buyers of TCCs 
predict congestion correctly most of the time. However, the TCC market does not appear 
efficient at hedging complex transactions, i.e., those involving larger exposures roughly 
of greater than $1/MWh or across multiple congestion interfaces.   Particularly, we obtain 
a robust result that prices and revenues are consistently biased in one direction, with TCC 
buyers paying prices for expensive TCCs far in excess of any reasonable risk premium.  
Furthermore, cumulative analysis of the entire two-year data set indicates no evidence of 
market participants learning how to use the instrument more efficiently over time.  
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For future work, we would like to examine the efficiency of transmission congestion risk 
management in other deregulated electricity industries, such as ERCOT and that of the 
Pennsylvania-Maryland-New Jersey (PJM) Interconnection.  Whereas the latter employs 
a PTP approach similar to New York's, the former uses flowgate rights to manage 
congestion. Although our empirical evidence suggests otherwise, it could simply be that 
the disconnect between TCC prices and congestion rents is symptomatic of a new market 
with rules that are unfamiliar to most participants.  In fact, arbitraging away price 
differences in electricity markets may not be possible because of illiquidity and risk 
aversion as well as fear of regulatory action.  Indeed, arbitrage could often be confused 
for market manipulation, thereby allowing inefficiencies to remain.  Towards that end, 
we could also determine if the relationship between TCC prices and congestion rents 
implies that market participants are risk averse, i.e., if instead of the 45° line, a concave, 
non-linear function is the best fit to the data. The geographical analysis could also be 
enhanced by including indicator variables in the OLS regressions for various NYISO 
areas to determine which zones enable better hedging.  Employing a geographical 
information  system (GIS) would also increase the robustness of the results by enabling 
the creation of more accurate geographical indicators.  Another topic to pursue would be 
to determine actual hedging strategies for NYISO TCC market participants using the 
optimal risk hedging strategies.  Finally, for completeness, it would be interesting to 
include the reconfiguration auctions and the secondary market into our analysis of the 
NYISO TCC. 
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Appendix 
Summary of Auctions 
Table 18. Summary of NYISO Initial TCC Auctions, 2000 and 2001 
Spring 2000   # MW # Awards  Autumn 2000   # MW # Awards 
Two Year       Five Year      
Stage I R1 3/20/2000 446 76 Stage I R1 9/7/2000 433 77 
  R2 3/23/2000 453 107   R2 9/13/2000 452 68 
  R3 3/27/2000 437 113   R3 9/21/2000 508 51 
  R4 3/30/2000 486 111 Stage II 9/25/2000 316 44 
Stage II 4/3/2000 218 18 Two Year       
         Stage I R1 9/29/2000 1009 120 
Six Month          R2 10/5/2000 1172 102 
Stage I R1 4/6/2000 800 63 Stage II 10/11/2000 574 44 
  R2 4/10/2000 1202 75 Six Month       
  R3 4/13/2000 1538 76 Stage I R1 10/17/2000 2839 363 
  R4 4/17/2000 1376 70   R2 10/23/2000 2811 85 
Stage II 4/20/2000 712 33 Stage II 10/30/2000 1137 111 
                     
           
             
Spring 2001   # MW # Awards  Autumn 2001   # MW # Awards 
Six Month       Two Year      
Stage I R1 3/8/2001 3451 186 Stage II 8/24/2001 323 30 
  R2 3/16/2001 3437 198 One Year       
  R3 3/23/2001 3419 150 Stage II 8/31/2001 1075 61 
  R4 3/30/2001 3230 159 Six Month       
Two Year        Stage I R1 9/24/2001 2189 125 
Stage II 4/6/2001 385 29   R2 9/28/2001 2236 229 
One Year          R3 10/5/2001 2004 163 
Stage II 4/12/2001 956 65   R4 10/12/2001 2400 146 
Six Month        Stage II 10/19/2001 1148 62 
Stage II 4/20/2001 108 8         
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Figure 5.  TCC Price Paid and Congestion 
Rent Collected (100% Data for Round 1 
Spring 2000 Total Award Auction) 
Figure 8. TCC Price Paid and Congestion 
Rent Collected (90% Data for Round 2 
Spring 2000 Total Award Auction) 
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45-Degree Line OLS Regression  Figure 9. TCC Price Paid and Congestion 
Rent Collected (100% Data for Round 3 
Spring 2000 Total Award Auction) 
Figure 6. TCC Price Paid and Congestion 
Rent Collected (90% Data for Round 1 
Spring 2000 Total Award Auction) 
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45-Degree Line OLS Regression  Figure 10. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 3 Spring 2000 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 7. TCC Price Paid and Congestion 
Rent Collected (100% Data for Round 2 
Spring 2000 Total Award Auction) 
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Figure 11. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 4 Spring 2000 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 14.  TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 1 Autumn 2000 Total Award 
Auction) 
y = 0.6909x - 2136.4
R2 = 0.2244
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
-30,000 -20,000 -10,000 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
TCC Price ($/MW)
C
on
ge
st
io
n 
R
en
t (
$/
M
W
)
45-Degree Line OLS Regression  
y = 0.5621x + 1767.1
R2 = 0.7494
-20,000
-15,000
-10,000
-5,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
-20,000 -10,000 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000
TCC Price ($/MW)
C
on
ge
st
io
n 
R
en
t (
$/
M
W
)
45-Degree Line OLS Regression  
Figure 12. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 4 Spring 2000 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 15. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 2 Autumn 2000 Total Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 16.  TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 2 Autumn 2000 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 13.  TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 1 Autumn 2000 Total Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 20.  TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 2 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 17. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 1 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 21. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 3 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 18. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 1 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 22. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 3 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 19. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 2 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 26. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 3 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 23. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 4 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 27. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 4 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction)  
Figure 24.  TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 4 Spring 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
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y = 0.0676x + 790.76
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45-Degree Line OLS Regression  Figure 28. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 4 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 25. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 3 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
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y = 0.6616x + 470.62
R2 = 0.7921
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Figure 32. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 6 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 29. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 5 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
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Unique Award Analysis 
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Figure 30. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 5 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 33. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 1 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) y = 0.6844x + 471.48
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Figure 31.  TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 6 Autumn 2001 Total Award 
Auction) 
Figure 34. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 1 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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y = 0.9627x - 3863.6
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Figure 35. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 2 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 38. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 3 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 36. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 2 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 39. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 4 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 37. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 3 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 40. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 4 Spring 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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y = 0.5341x + 1817.4
R2 = 0.6376
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Figure 44. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 2 Autumn 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 41. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 1 Autumn 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 45. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 1 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 42. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 1 Autumn 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 46. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 1 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 43. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 2 Autumn 2000 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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y = 0.3434x + 292.89
R2 = 0.3872
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Figure 47. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 2 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 50. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 3 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 48. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 2 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 51. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 4 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 52. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 4 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 49. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 3 Spring 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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y = 0.0285x + 837.96
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Figure 53. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 3 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 56. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 4 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 54. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 3 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 57. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 5 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 55. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 4 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
Figure 58. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 5 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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y = 0.6921x + 461.13
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Figure 59. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (100% Data 
for Round 6 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 60. TCC Price Paid and 
Congestion Rent Collected (90% Data for 
Round 6 Autumn 2001 Unique Award 
Auction) 
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Figure 61.  TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 1 of Spring 2000) 
PPI v G I Round 2
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Figure 62. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 2 of Spring 2000)
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PPI v GI Round 3
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PPI v GI Round 2
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Figure 63. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 3 of Spring 2000) 
Figure 66. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 2 of Autumn 2000) 
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PPI v GI Round 4
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Figure 67. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 1 of Spring 2001) 
Figure 64. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 4 of Spring 2000) 
  
PPI v GI Round 1
y = -15.299x2 + 1556.4x + 1942.7
R2 = 0.1736
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
GI
P
P
I
($
/M
W
)
 
PPI v GI Round 2
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Figure 65. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 1 of Autumn 2000) 
Figure 68. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 2 of Spring 2001) 
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PPI v GI Round 3
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P P I v  G I Ro u n d  4
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Figure 72. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 4 of Autumn 2001) 
Figure 69. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 3 of Spring 2001) 
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PPI v GI Round 4
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Figure 70. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 4 of Spring 2001) 
Figure 73. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 5 of Autumn 2001) 
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PPI v GI Round 6
y = 30.651x2 + 1.9166x + 672.14
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Figure 71. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 3 of Autumn 2001) 
Figure 74. TCC Predictive Power Index 
and Geographical Indicator (100% Data 
for Round 6 of Autumn 2001)
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